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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Another driver negligently hits your car at a high rate of speed.  You sustain a 
fractured femur, which requires a rod to be inserted into your leg to assist the bone in 
healing.  After a year of doctor visits and physical therapy, your doctor releases you 
from active care and instructs you to continue home therapy exercises and to follow 
up with her as needed.  Your leg has some occasional aches and pains, but you’re not 
bothered with normal activities.  Your medical bills total approximately $35,000, and 
you lost approximately $15,000 in income due to four months off work.  The 
negligent driver’s insurance company’s claims representative contacts you to set an 
appointment to meet with you to settle your claim.  He asks you to think about what 
would fairly compensate you for your pain and suffering.  Take a second and think 
about how much money would fairly compensate you for your injury claim. 
How did you evaluate your fair settlement?  Did you take the amount of special 
damages ($50,000) and multiply it by a factor of three, four or ten?  Did you take the 
number of days you were treated for this injury (365) and multiply it by $100, $250, 
or $500 for each day of care and add in your specials?  Did you look at jury verdicts 
in your venue to determine the amount a jury awarded for this injury?  Personal 
injury lawyers and claims professionals have all used these types of “evaluations.”1  
These “evaluations” yield wildly different results from $150,000 to $500,000, from 
                                                                
1See PAT MAGARICK & KENN BROWNLEE, CASUALTY INS. CLAIMS § 16:11 (4th ed. 1995); 
Robert Darroch, Too Great Expectations: Unrealistic Plaintiffs Force Big Companies to Trial, 
FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Apr. 30, 2002; Sally Whitney, Calculating the Value of Pain, 
BEST’S REV. 131 (Nov. 2001).  
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$86,500 to $232,500, and from $128,8002 to $250,000.3  Perhaps this uncertainty 
contributes to why “compensation for pain and suffering is widely perceived as one 
of tort law’s worst excesses and is a popular target for reform.”4
Insurers, wanting to assist their claims professionals in evaluating bodily injury 
claims more consistently, looked to artificial intelligence for an answer.  Allstate led 
the charge by implementing “Claim Core Process Redesign (CCPR)”5 to remedy its 
findings of past inconsistent claims payments.6  As part of its CCPR program, 
Allstate began using Colossus, a software program designed to help the insurer 
evaluate injury claims more consistently.  By 2002, twelve of the top twenty 
insurance companies in North America used Colossus.7  Personal injury lawyers 
began attacking the insurance industry’s use of the computer program.8  A seminar 
called “How to Hammer Allstate,”9 became the hot ticket for continuing legal 
education classes around the country.10  Plaintiffs’ lawyers also wrote articles in 
                                                                
2Karen Birkmeyer v. City Dash, Inc., 15 No. 10, JAS Publications, Inc., 17 (2001) 
(reporting a Hamilton County, Ohio, jury verdict), available at 2001 WL 898856. 
3Andrew Gray v. Jerry A. Sherrod, Jr. & Werner Enterprises, Inc., 17 No. 1, JAS 
Publications, Inc. (2002) (reporting a Franklin County, Ohio, jury verdict), available at 2002 
WL 31299742. 
4JACOB A. STEIN, STEIN ON PERSONAL INJURY DAMAGES § 22:8 (2003). 
5Mark Ballard, Allstate Faces New Liability, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 7, 2000, at A1.  Allstate’s 
CCPR program also attempted to reduce the number of claimants seeking legal representation. 
Id.  Allstate’s claims representatives advised its injured claimants that hiring an attorney will 
cost the injured party about a third of his/her settlement and likely delay the claims process. Id.  
According to a 1998 Insurance Research Council study, represented claimants yield a loss of 
$699 after deducting the claimants’ economic losses (medical bills and wages), court costs and 
attorney fees, while unrepresented claimants gained $133.  MAGARICK & BROWNLEE, supra 
note 1, at §§ 1:18, 2:14 (citing “Paying for Auto Injuries,” Insurance Research Council, 718 
Providence RD, Malvern, PA 19355-0725, Chapter 4).  Furthermore, a represented claimant’s 
claim will settle within three months of the accident 19% of the time, but take more than a 
year 42% of the time. Id. at § 2:14.  However, an unrepresented claimant will settle his/her 
claim 55% of the time within three months and only 7% take longer than a year. Id. 
6See Barbara Bowers, Take it to Court, BEST’S REV. (May 2000) (quoting Allstate’s 
spokesman Jim Dudas that Allstate admits overpayment and underpayment of injury claims in 
the past). 
7Jerry Guidera, ‘Colossus’ at the Accident Scene: Insurers Use a Software Program to Pay 
Out Claims for Injuries, But Law Suits Claim Its Misused, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2003, at C1. 
8See Mark Ballard, Hot CLE Class: Hammering Allstate, 22 No. 16 THE NAT’L L.J., Dec. 
13, 1999 (quoting Allstate’s general counsel William Vainisi, who claim that Allstate is not at 
war with all personal injury lawyers, but is only against the ones that condone “built-up 
medicals [to impact] general damages”). 
9Id. (stating a record number of people attended the Washington state seminar). 
10See id.; Evelyn Apgar, Combat Lesson: P.I. Lawyers Take Dead Aim at Allstate, 42 N.J. 
LAW.: WKLY. NEWSPAPER, Oct. 16, 2000, at 2071.   
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magazines and newspapers expressing concerns of the insurance industry’s use of 
Colossus.11   
The plaintiff’s bar began filing lawsuits on behalf of its injured clients in various 
states indirectly attacking the insurance companies’ use of Colossus through claims 
of failure to negotiate in good faith, bad faith claims handling, misrepresentation, and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress.12  A class action lawsuit filed in New 
Mexico alleges “breach of contract, misrepresentation, violations of the covenants of 
good faith and fair dealings, [and] bad faith” through the insurer’s use of Colossus.13  
And as recent as February 2004, a group of California property and casualty 
policyholders filed a class action lawsuit against Farmers Group, Inc. alleging breach 
of duty of good faith and fair dealing, breach of contract, fraud by concealment, 
fraud by false promise and unfair business practices through Farmers’ use of 
Colossus.14
Because the law of bad faith is the most volatile of the causes of action,15 this 
Note will discuss how using Colossus demonstrates good faith claims handling by 
                                                                
11See Rodney F. Pillsbury, Dear Colossus, TRIAL, Feb. 1, 2001, available at 2001 WL 
12692417 (publishing a demand letter that Mr. Pillsbury addressed to Colossus instead of the 
claims professional); Ritchenya A. Shepherd, Jury Returns Verdict Six Times As Large As 
Allstate’s Settlement Offer: Insurance Co. Used Computer to Figure Settlement Amount, No. 
62 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 31, 1998, at 3; Jeffrey A. Block, Colossus Mess, 215 N.Y.L.J. 
2, 2 (1996) (letter to the editor). 
12Kosierowski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 51 F. Supp. 2d 583, 594 (E.D. Pa. 1999) aff’d, 234 F.3d 
1265 (3d. Cir. 2000) (applying Pennsylvania law, plaintiff alleged Allstate acted in bad faith 
when Allstate used Colossus to evaluate plaintiff’s underinsured motorist claim); Shekhter v. 
Financial Indem. Co., 89 Cal. App. 4th 141, 148 (2001) (claiming Colossus is “an illegal set of 
claim criteria”); Benyo v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. SCV 37386, 1998 EXTRA LEXIS 82, at *6, 
11-12, 18, 21 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1998) (granting Allstate’s summary judgment 
motion nullifying plaintiff’s claims of bad faith claims handling, breach of contract and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress due to Allstate’s claims handling which included the 
use of Colossus to evaluate the plaintiff’s underinsured motorist claim); Hovet v. Lujan, 66 
P.3d 980, 982 (N.M. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing Amicus brief by New Mexico Trial Lawyers 
Association that claims Allstate’s use of Colossus “evaluates claims ‘without any real regard 
for the individual characteristics of any particular claim or claimant’”); Penberthy v. Caprett, 
No. 77416, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 247, at *12, 13 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001) (alleging Colossus 
did not completely and fairly evaluate Plaintiff’s psychological injury claim).  
13Truong v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. CV-99-003474 at 6 (N.M. 2d Jud. Dist. filed Apr. 8, 
1999). 
14In re Farmers Colossus Litigation, No. BC289250 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. filed Feb. 
23, 2004). 
15Mark Gergen, Symposium on the Law of Bad Faith in Contract and Insurance: The 
Availability of Tort Remedies for Breach of Contract: A Cautionary Tale about Contractual 
Good Faith in Texas, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1235, 1236 (1994) (“The huge stakes in bad faith cases 
and its flimsy doctrinal garb make this a particularly volatile area of the law.”).  Because the 
standard for bad faith actions changes so frequently, any plaintiff interested in pursuing an 
insurer should consult Stephen Ashley’s treatise BAD FAITH ACTIONS, at note 62, infra, for the 
latest decisions in each jurisdiction. 
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insurance companies.16  Initially, this Note will discuss how Colossus works so 
readers have an understanding of the product.  Following the Colossus section, the 
Note will discuss the history of bad faith.  Finally, this Note will analyze how 
Colossus assists insurers in meeting the different good faith standards across the 
nation.  
II.  WHAT IS COLOSSUS? 
In simplest terms, an insurer uses Colossus to assist its claims professionals in 
placing a dollar value on personal injury claims.  When Allstate began using the 
system, the public knew very little about how it worked.17  Personal injury lawyers 
did not like the secrecy.18  Insurers must keep the intellectual property information 
confidential due to non-disclosure agreements with Computer Sciences Corporation 
(“CSC”), proprietary owner of Colossus.19  Instead of considering CSC’s monetary 
investment and intellectual property rights, plaintiffs’ attorneys assumed that the 
insurers’ secrecy indicated foul play.20  Personal injury lawyers launched a campaign 
to acquire knowledge about the computer program.21  Through litigation, personal 
injury lawyers began using discovery to obtain information about Colossus.22  When 
an attorney would obtain information about the system, he would share it with 
others.23  Today, there are dozens of articles in law journals and on the Internet 
                                                                
16Other expert systems like ICE and ISO Claims Outcome Advisor do exist. Whitney, 
supra note 1, at 131.  Colossus, however, is the most widely known.  Roselyn Bonanti & 
David Ratcliff, Colossus: What it is and How Insurance Firms Misuse it, FORUM, July/Aug. 
2001, at 10 [hereinafter Colossus].  Therefore, the Colossus system will be the focus of this 
paper. 
17See Sylvia Hsieh, PI Lawyers Find New Ways to Beat ‘Colossus,’ LAW. WKLY USA, 
Sept. 15, 2003. 
18See Christine A. Bremer & Lance Trollop, Colossus, WIS. ACAD. OF TRIAL LAW., Jan. 
2002, at 13; Bonanti & Ratcliff, Colossus, supra note 16, at 10.  
19See William F. Merlin, Jr. & Mary E. Kestenbaum, Colossus: Taking on a Giant, TRIAL, 
Sept., 2000, at 6. 
20Joe Frey, Allstate Under Colossal Pressure From Trial Bar, 26 CONN. L. TRIB, Aug. 14, 
2000, at 1; Joe Frey, Putting a Price on Auto Injuries: How Software Called Colossus 
Evaluates Claimant’s Pain, 26 CONN. L. TRIB., Aug. 14, 2000, available at 
http://info.insure.com/auto/collision/colossus.html [hereinafter Putting a Price on Auto 
Injuries]. 
21Ballard, supra note 5. 
22Hsieh, supra note 17; see also Ralph Buss, Tall Stories, Lies and Other Biker Bull, 
NATL. COALITION OF MOTORCYCLISTS & AID TO INJURED MOTORCYCLISTS, Apr. 10, 2003, at 
27, available at http://www.bikernews.com/StoriesP27.htm (stating that the A.I.M. attorney 
network shares information); Debbie Lynn Elias, Trial Resources, TRIAL EXCELLENCE, Oct.  
2001, at 10-11 (sharing web sites that will provide information about Colossus). 
23See Merlin & Kestenbaum, supra note 19 (stating a Colossus manual is “available 
through ATLA’s [American Trial Lawyer’s Association] Bad Faith Litigation Group” and 
citing two cases where information about Colossus has been discovered). 
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regarding Colossus.  However, few of them are accurate.  Therefore, this section will 
summarize the actual facts of the system.24   
An Australian company developed the software program in the late eighties.25  
The Continuum Company purchased the program and CSC acquired the Continuum 
Company in 1996 bringing Colossus to CSC.26  Many people believe Colossus was 
the first expert system to evaluate personal injury claims, but it was not.27  As early 
as 1983, ComLaw marketed a software package called P.I. Damages to attorneys.28  
The system “permit[ted] an attorney to perform a sophisticated evaluation of 
personal injury and wrongful death claims . . . .  Using a series of questions, P. I. 
Damages enable[d]” an attorney to determine the potential settlement value of a 
claim.29  Colossus works in the same basic way by asking a claims professional “a 
series of interactive questions.”30  These questions simulate the human thought 
process to assist a claims professional in determining the value of a personal injury 
claim.31  Long before the information can be entered by the claims professional, the 
insurance company must lay the foundation to obtain values from Colossus. 
Once an insurer decides to license Colossus, it has quite a bit of work to do to 
implement the system.  Different insurance companies have different settlement 
philosophies.32  Consequently, Colossus does not determine the value of an injury 
without using an insurer’s data.33  While each company sets up the system 
differently, generally a company will conduct roundtables to “assess the claim value 
factors” in an injury claim.34  The insurance company’s most skilled and experienced 
casualty claims professionals come together to “evaluate hypothetical injury 
claims.”35  Next, the insurance company may conduct a closed claims study to 
                                                                
24In determining which facts to use, this author used articles written by insurance industry 
sources since the insurers know how Colossus works.  From the plaintiff’s side, this author 
used articles written by William F. Merlin, Jr., who specializes in bad faith litigation and has 
given presentations about how Colossus works. William F. Merlin, Jr., Presentation at the 
Ninth National Forum on Litigating Bad Faith and Punitive Damages (Apr. 28, 2003).  
25Tony Attrino, Software Helps Bolster Claims Assessment, NATL. UNDERWRITER – PROP. 
& CASUALTY, May 4, 1998, at 14. 
26Press Release, CSC, CSC, Continuum Set Shareholders Meetings to Approve Merge 
(June 6, 1996), available at http://www.csc.com/newsandevents/news/1281.shtml.  
27See Legal Economics, 9 A.B.A. 58, 58 (1983). 
28Id. 
29Id. 
30Mike Conroy & Steve Barney, Case Evaluation Tools in the Claims Handling Process 
(Nov. 21, 2002), (on file with author). 
31LIABILITY CLAIM PRACTICES 8.31 (James R. Jones ed., Insurance Institute of America 
2003) (2001) [hereinafter Jones]. 
32Darroch, supra note 1.  
33Frey, Putting a Price on Auto Injuries, supra note 20. 
34Jones, supra note 31, at 8.31-32. 
35Id. 
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compare the baseline values determined by the roundtables to its claims practice 
history.36  The insurer uses both the closed claim study and the roundtables to assign 
monetary values to injury severity.37  
After CSC enters the insurer’s data, the claims professional can evaluate an 
injury.  The claims professional first begins the evaluation by entering claim data, 
such as the insured’s name, claimant’s name and age and the venue.38  Next, the 
claims professional enters all diagnosed and accident related injuries.39  Once the 
claims professional enters the correct injuries into the system, Colossus guides the 
claims professional through a series of questions regarding the treatment, prognosis, 
pre-existing conditions, and symptoms of the injury.40  Colossus has over 10,000 
rules determining what questions the system will ask the user based on the prior 
entries by the claims professional.41  The program uses the type and length of 
treatment along with the documented subjective complaints to assess the injury.42  
Colossus will also ask the claims professional if the injured party had difficulty 
doing certain activities during his/her recovery period.43  The claims professional can 
also enter information regarding a claimant’s inability to continue certain hobbies in 
his/her life.44  Colossus then assigns severity points based on the totality of the 
entries submitted by the claims professional.45  Colossus, using the insurer’s 
information regarding the value of injuries, then recommends a value for the injury 
claim.46  The claims professional then uses this information as a guide in determining 
the settlement value of the injury claim.47      
                                                                
36Frey, See Putting a Price on Auto Injuries, supra note 20.  Critics of Colossus attack the 
lack of jury verdicts in the evaluation system. Merlin & Kestenbaum, supra note 19. However, 
Allstate states that it considered jury verdicts when determining the base values. Guidera, 
supra note 7.  By using the closed claims study, the insurer would likely have some data from 
those closed claims that involved jury verdicts.    
37See Jones, supra note 31; Frey, Putting a Price on Auto Injuries, supra note 20. 
38William F. Merlin, Colossus: What We Know Today (2000) (unpublished article) (on file 
with author).  
39Id.; see also Merlin & Kestenbaum, supra note 19.  
40See Colossus – Knowledge is the Key, RECOVERY AND RESOLUTION (Graham Lundberg 
& Peschel) Feb./Mar. 2003, available at www.glpattorneys.com/GLPnsltrFebMar2003.pdf 
[hereinafter Colossus - Knowledge is the Key]. 
41Conroy & Barney, supra note 30. 
42See Merlin & Kestenbaum, supra note 19. 
43Colossus—Knowledge is the Key, supra note 40. 
44Videotape: Secrets to Increasing Colossus Settlements (Litigation One Publishing 2003) 
(available through www.litigationone.com/Publications.htm 1) (supplying personal injury 
attorneys with a sample “New Client Letter” to advise injured parties to document any 
limitations in participating in activities due to injuries suffered from the accident). 
45Jones, supra note 31, at 8.32. 
46While Colossus can evaluate over six hundred traumatic injuries, some injuries cannot 
be evaluated by the system.  Conroy & Barney, supra note 30.  These injuries include Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”), traumatic dental injuries, scarring, fatalities, and severe 
head injuries with cognitive defects.  Penberthy v. Caprett, No. 77416, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 
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Furthermore, Colossus has more to offer than just the recommended settlement 
value.  The system offers a reference system and links to Internet sites.48  The 
reference system allows a claims professional to look up medical terms, average 
treatment periods for an injury, types of complications associated with certain 
injuries, and other medical information.49  Colossus allows the user to access the 
Internet while entering a consultation.50  An insurer can access websites such as 
“medicine.net,” which explains medications, or “myhealthscore.com,” which defines 
treatment codes provided on billing statements while evaluating an injury.  The 
reference system and websites available in Colossus enable the claims professional 
to analyze medical information completely through information technology.51   
Colossus also assists claims managers and supervisors by tracking the settlement 
and injury data.52  This information can be helpful in evaluating the proper settlement 
value for injury claims and areas for training the claims professionals.53  While 
courts sometimes frown upon insurers tracking claim payments,54 the information 
assists insurers in identifying new trends.55  For example, claims that continuously 
settle higher than the recommended value provided by Colossus may show that the 
value the insurer placed on that type of injury needs to be increased.56  Furthermore, 
Colossus can track injury diagnoses, which enables the insurer to notice trends in the 
injuries being claimed.57  For example, if the insurer notes a rise in 
temporamandibular joint syndrome (“TMJ”) claims, the insurer can request training 
for its employees in this area.58  All the information available through Colossus 
                                                          
247, at *12 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001); see also Frey, Putting a Price on Auto Injuries, supra note 
20.  
47Gary Mogel, Claims Software Cited in Bad Faith Suit, NATL. UNDERWRITER – PROP. & 
CASUALTY, May 26, 2003 (“The Colossus tool is intended to support the human decision-
making process, not to replace the claim representative’s experience or judgment.”). 
48See Jones, supra note 31, at 8.32; Matt Damsker, ASAP, RISK & INS., Jan. 1, 2002. 
49See Jones, supra note 31, at 8.32-33. 
50See Damsker, supra note 48. 
51See id.; Jones, supra note 31, at 8.32-33. 
52Conroy & Barney, supra note 30. 
53MAGARICK & BROWNLEE, supra note 1, at § 16.26. 
54See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Weiford, 831 P.2d 1264, 1267-68 (Alaska 1992) 
(finding the insurer’s tracking of settlement data was a factor in determining the insurer put its 
interests above the insured’s but not the sole issue).  
55MAGARICK & BROWNLEE, supra note 1, at § 16.26; see also Conroy & Barney, supra 
note 30. 
56Colossus has a tuning system, which allows an insurer to update the values. Whitney, 
supra note 1. 
57Damsker, supra note 48. 
58Some attorneys have expressed concern about Colossus’ ability to track attorney 
information.  See Bremer & Trollop, supra note 18, at 13.  Many sources that explain how to 
evaluate claims using traditional methods recommend considering the abilities of plaintiff’s 
counsel.  Jones, supra note 31, at 8.27; see also Voland v. Farmers Ins. Co., 943 P.2d 808, 813 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
114 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:107 
assists the claims professional in determining the proper value for personal injury 
claims. 
III.  COLOSSUS AND GOOD FAITH CLAIMS HANDLING 
Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1945 giving each state the power 
to regulate its insurance industry.59  Therefore, insurance law, including causes of 
action for bad faith, significantly differs in each state.  A brief history of how bad 
faith originated should be reviewed to demonstrate why Colossus assists insurers in 
avoiding bad faith conduct. 
A.  History of Bad Faith Causes of Action 
The insurance industry had noble beginnings.  “It was the presence of insurance 
that allowed merchants to take the risks of commerce, by land and sea, in the 
millennias when only frail sailing ships or horse-drawn carts were available.”60  
Today, insurance allows “pharmaceutical companies to create new wonder-drugs, 
telecommunication companies to risk the launching of multi-million dollar satellites, 
[and] state and local governments to build bridges and tunnels.”61  However, many 
perople have a negative attitude regarding insurance and an overall lack of trust in 
insurance adjusters.62  While phone book, billboard and television advertisements by 
the plaintiffs’ bar may generate an attitude of distrust by the public,63 insurance 
companies share the blame.   
Insurers in the late 1800s began abusing their bargaining power by forcing third 
parties to trial to recover damages.  Insurers knew the policy limits limited the 
insurers’ monetary damages, leaving the insured to pay for any amount a jury might 
award in excess of the policy limits.64  Therefore, insurers had little incentive to 
settle.65  For example, in Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.,66 the 
plaintiff had policy limits with the insurer for $1,500.67  The injured third party 
                                                          
n.3 (Ariz. 1997) (stating that the “reputation and effectiveness of counsel” is a factor to be 
used in evaluating a personal injury claim).  However, attorney information has not been 
confirmed as having anything more than tracking purposes in Colossus. 
5915 U.S.C. § 1011 (1945). 
60MAGARICK & BROWNLEE, supra note 1, at § 1:18.  
61Id. 
62See id.  The distrust of insurance companies, in general, may also explain why courts are 
willing to accept the tort of bad faith in insurance cases.  With the exception of employment 
cases, insurance companies are the only ones punished by bad faith actions even “though the 
rationale that justifies extension of the cause of action . . . applies to ordinary commercial 
contract cases.”  STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH ACTIONS – LIABILITY AND DAMAGES, § 11:3 
(2d ed. 1997).   
63See MAGARICK & BROWNLEE, supra note 1, at § 1:18.    
64See Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565, 571 (Ariz. 1986).  
65Acquista v. New York Life Ins. Co., 285 A.D.2d 73, 79 (N.Y. 2001) (stating that 
limiting the insurer’s liability to the policy limits fails to adequately compensate the insured). 
6643 A. 503 (Me. 1899).   
67Id. 
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offered to settle his claim for $1,000 before trial, but defendant refused exposing the 
plaintiff to liability for an excess judgment.68  The trial court awarded $1,000 over 
the liability limit, which plaintiff had to pay.69  Plaintiff claimed that the defendant 
breached the contract and owed the full judgment,70 but the Maine Supreme Court 
determined that the policy language clearly stated the insurer owed only the amount 
of its liability limits.71  Rumford demonstrates “the early attitude of the courts that an 
insurer commits no breach of the policy when it exercises its power to control the 
defense and settlement of claims against . . . its insured.”72
Because courts did not allow a remedy under a breach of contract cause of action, 
policyholders began looking to tort causes of action.73  In Brown & McCabe, 
Stevedores, Inc. v. London Guarantee & Accident Co.,74 the trial judge sided with the 
insured.75  After the injured party received a judgment in excess of the policy limits, 
the insured brought a tort action against the insurer.76  The trial judge admitted that 
no case law existed to find for the insured, but ruled in his favor because the 
insurance company failed to “[litigate] in good faith.”77  After Brown & McCabe, 
policyholders began using the tort of bad faith to obtain a remedy for insurance 
adjustment abuses.78   
While bad faith causes of action originated in third-party policy limits cases, 
many states expanded the cause of action to include other claims adjustment 
abuses.79  For example, the Texas Supreme Court held that if an insurer acted 
unreasonably in denying a first-party claim, the policyholder has a bad faith claim 
against the insurer.80  The Ohio Supreme Court determined that the insurer’s 
                                                                
68Id. at 504.  
69Id. at 505. 
70Id. 
71Id. at 506 (claiming that the insurer owed the full damages since the contract stated the 
insurer would defend the insured “at its own cost.”  The court stated the policy limits clearly 
limited the liability payment by the insurer to $1500 and “its cost” meant the expenses 
incurred in defending the case). 
72ASHLEY, supra note 62, at § 2:02. 
73See G. A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. Am. Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544, 546-47 (Tex. 1929).  
74232 F. 298 (D. Or. 1915). 
75Id. at 299.  
76Id. 
77Id. 
78ASHLEY, supra note 62, at § 2:03.  
79Lyons v. Millers Cas. Ins. Co., 866 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Tex. 1993) (stating that an insurer 
is liable to an insured for damages resulting from an unreasonable denial of a claim); Tank v. 
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 715 P.2d 1133, 1137-38 (stating that an insurer must thoroughly 
investigate the insured’s claim and provide an adequate defense for the claim even if 
defending under a reservation of rights due to questionable coverage); see also Penberthy, 
2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 247, at *8-10,13-14 (holding that an insurer may owe pre-judgment 
interest if it fails to negotiate a settlement in good faith). 
80Lyons, 866 S.W.2d at 601.  
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
116 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:107 
inadequate investigation of a fire loss amounted to an actionable bad faith claim.81  In 
Alabama, the insurer acts in bad faith if it intentionally fails to “diligently investigate 
the facts, fairly evaluate the claim, and act promptly and reasonably.”82  By using 
Colossus, or other expert systems, insurers properly evaluate and investigate claims 
to avoid allegations of bad faith by their insureds and claimants. 
B.  How Using Colossus Demonstrates Good Faith Claims Handling  
Under Each Jurisdiction’s Standards 
In suing an insurer for bad faith, a plaintiff may base a cause of action against the 
insurer on common law, statute or both, depending on the jurisdiction.  If a 
jurisdiction does not recognize the tort of bad faith,83 an insured may have a remedy 
under a breach of contract claim.84  If the common law fails to provide a remedy, the 
legislature may enact statutes to provide the insured a remedy against the insurance 
company.85   
1.  Tort of Bad Faith 
States that recognize bad faith as a tort will apply one of two basic standards: 
negligence86 or bad faith.87   
a.  Negligence Standard 
A minority of jurisdictions apply a negligence standard in determining whether 
an insurer acted in bad faith.88  Under this negligence standard, an insurer can be 
liable to its insured for damages resulting from the insurer’s failure to act as an 
ordinary prudent person would to protect the insured’s interest.89  The courts state 
that the insurer needs to manage the claim as if the insurer’s assets are exposed 
                                                                
81Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co., 644 N.E.2d 397, 400 (Ohio 1994).  
82LeFevre v. Westberry, 590 So. 2d 154, 161 (Ala. 1991).  
83See Zoppo, 644 N.E.2d at 399. 
84See Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 799 (Utah 1985). 
85Jung v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 949 F. Supp. 353, 360 (E.D. Pa. 1997).  Both the 
injured party and the insurance company must determine the applicable standard for bad faith 
actions in the jurisdiction.  This knowledge helps each party to evaluate their strategy for legal 
action and also to determine the applicable statute of limitations.  A tort action of bad faith 
may have a statute of limitations of two years. Christiansen v. First Ins. Co. of Hawaii, Ltd., 
967 P.2d 639, 647 (Haw. 1998). A bad faith action based on contract law may have the 
limitation imposed by the terms of the policy. Stahl v. Preston Mut. Ins. Ass’n, 517 N.W.2d 
201, 202 (determining the one year limitation stated in the policy applied to the policyholder’s 
claim for bad faith).  The court may impose the statute of limitations noted in the applicable 
statute. Schwartz v. Travelers Indem. Co., 740 N.E.2d 1039, 1044 (determining the 
Massachusetts legislature intended a four year statute of limitations for the claim of bad faith). 
86Lyons, 866 S.W.2d at 601. 
87Danner v. Auto-Owners Ins., 629 N.W.2d 159, 162 (Wis. 2001).  
88ASHLEY, supra note 62, at § 2:04.  
89See G. A. Stowers, 15 S.W.2d at 547. 
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instead of the insured’s.90  Courts reason that the insurance company owes a duty of 
due care to the insured because the insurer contracted with the insured to take 
complete control of the settlement process for third-party liability claims.91  Making 
the insurer liable for negligent decisions by the insurance company protects the 
insured’s assets.92  The negligence standard has not been used for other first-party 
claims, however.93  The courts generally require the bad faith standard in proving an 
insurer failed to adequately investigate or promptly pay a claim when the 
policyholder is the beneficiary of the claim payment.94  The insurer no longer has the 
absolute control of settlement because the policyholder directly plays a role in 
whether it will accept the settlement or not.95
Under Texas law, the courts apply a negligence standard locally known as the 
Stowers doctrine.96  An insurer acts in bad faith if it does not act with the care and 
diligence that a reasonable person would use in his/her own management of affairs.97  
In Stowers, the third-party claimant offered to settle her case before trial for $4,000, 
$1,000 less than the policy limits provided by defendant American Indemnity to 
plaintiff Stowers.98  Defendant refused to settle the claim exposing Stowers’ assets to 
an excess verdict.99  The judgment exceeded the plaintiff’s policy limits and plaintiff 
satisfied the judgment of $14,107.15.100  Plaintiff sought reimbursement for the full 
amount from American Indemnity.101  Because American Indemnity contracted with 
Stowers to completely control the defense of the lawsuit by the third party, the Texas 
Supreme Court determined that American Indemnity owed Stowers a duty to 
                                                                
90See Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. Soriano, 881 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Tex. 1994). 
91See G. A. Stowers, 15 S.W.2d at 547. 
92See Great Divide Ins. Co. v. Carpenter, 79 P.3d 599, 608-09 (Alaska 2003). 
93See STEPHEN S. ASHLEY, BAD FAITH LIABILITY: A STATE-BY-STATE REVIEW §§ 3:01-
3:51 (Callaghan & Co. 1987) (summarizing the current standard for each state for claims made 
by third-party beneficiaries and first-party beneficiaries) [hereinafter ASHLEY, BAD FAITH 
LIABILITY]; see also ASHLEY, supra note 62, at §§ 2:04-15. 
94See ASHLEY, BAD FAITH LIABILITY, supra note 93, at §§ 3:01-51; see also ASHLEY, 
supra note 62, at §§ 2:04-15.  
95See Leal v. Allstate Ins. Co., 17 P.3d 95, 99 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a third 
party does not have a direct cause of action against the insurer because the third party has not 
given up control of the claim to the insurer). 
96Sam Hawthorne, Note, Stowers Doctrine Catch-22 Resolved for Texas Insurers Faced 
with Multiple Claimants and Inadequate Insurance Proceeds: Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. 
Soriano, 26 TEX. TECH L. REV. 169, 170 (1995). 
97Texas Farmers, 881 S.W.2d at 314; G. A. Stowers, 15 S.W.2d at 547. 
98G. A. Stowers, 15 S.W.2d at 545. 
99Id. 
100Id. 
101Id. at 544. 
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exercise due care in defending the insured.102  In a negligence standard jurisdiction, 
the insurer must act as a reasonable person would in evaluating the risk of trial.103   
When an insurer uses Colossus, the insurer carefully and completely evaluates 
the injury.  An insurer must fully appreciate the value of the injury to exercise the 
due care required by a negligence jurisdiction.104  The “general damage elements of a 
personal injury claim . . . are inherently flexible and subject to differing and 
potentially changing evaluations . . . . [E]valuating personal injury claims … is no 
more precise or predictable than throwing darts at a board.”105  The insurer, through 
Colossus, removes some of the guesswork from ascertaining a proper value for the 
claim.  A properly evaluated claim can assist the insurer in determining if the insurer 
should pay the demand by the injured party or defend its insured.  Traditional 
methods of evaluating a claim include calculating injuries through mathematical 
formulas, using a per diem calculation and reviewing jury verdicts.  
The most commonly known settlement value calculation involves taking the 
amount of economic losses (wages, medical bills, etc.) and multiplying it by a factor 
of three, four, or even ten.106  This outdated method of calculating injury value causes 
unfair and disproportionate settlements.  For example, a person who is treated and 
released from the hospital with a diagnosis of a cervical strain likely will have about 
the same amount of medical bills as a person who has a diagnosis of a fractured rib.  
A person with a fractured rib feels pain every time she breathes but will be paid the 
same amount as a person who experiences pain with only certain activities.107  
Additionally, a person who is paid $15.00 an hour but loses the same amount of time 
off work as a person who only makes $7.50 an hour will get twice as much money in 
a formula that calculates special damages multiplied by a factor of three.  How does 
the income of a person determine the amount of pain he or she experiences?  While 
this formula provides a firm value for the claimed injury, its value is derived from 
the arbitrariness of where the injured party sought treatment and how much money 
she earns.  The multiplication factor does not require an insurer to use reasonable 
care to evaluate the injury. 
Another type of calculation used to determine the value of an injury claim is to 
assess dollar amount for the pain for certain time periods.  A per diem calculation 
measures a person’s general damages “in terms of a stated number of dollars for 
specific periods of time.”108  While this method may be popular among trial attorneys 
                                                                
102Id. at 548. 
103See Texas Farmers, 881 S.W.2d at 315. 
104G. A. Stowers, 15 S.W.2d at 545. 
105Voland, 943 P.2d at 812-13. 
106MAGARICK & BROWNLEE, supra note 1, at §§ 16:11 17:9.  
107Sally Whitney demonstrates another example of the unfairness of the multiplication 
factor evaluation. Whitney, supra note 1.  “[A] person claiming a back injury could have 
$5,000 worth of diagnostic tests run only to find that there is no injury and no treatment is 
needed.  Another person with a broken leg could go to the hospital, have the leg casted and 
receive physical therapy, all of which could total $5,000.  Under the [multiplication . . . factor 
evaluation], both people would receive the same award for pain and suffering.” Id. 
108Beagle v. Vasold, 417 P.2d 673, 676 (Cal. 1966). 
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during closing arguments,109 it is not very helpful in determining a proper settlement 
value.  An insurer may find it beneficial to evaluate the claimant’s pain and suffering 
in smaller increments of time.110  However, the insurer merely could be taking a total 
lump sum and dividing it up into smaller segments,111 which is not the purpose of a 
per diem injury evaluation.  Nothing in the per diem argument gives an insurer a 
guidepost in determining the value of certain injuries.  Is $1.00 a day sufficient for a 
cervical strain, or should it be $5.00 a day?  This type of arbitrary evaluation should 
be avoided in order to properly evaluate the insured’s risk of an excess verdict 
against his assets. 
The final common method of evaluating injury claims is jury verdict research.  
Reviewing jury reporters for jury awards on certain injuries can assist the insurer in 
determining the likely outcome of a claim that goes to trial.  However, this method 
has two basic flaws for evaluating settlement values.  First, only a small percentage 
of claims actually reach a jury verdict.112  Second, jury verdicts are “neither rational 
nor predictable” making it difficult to use the verdict research obtained for a 
particular case.113  Past jury awards provide the insurer with a worst-case and best-
case scenario, but they fail to provide the average outcome of a case.114  Therefore, 
jury verdict research is not efficient in helping the claims professional to determine if 
the insurer will risk the insured’s assets by going to trial. 
Unlike the traditional methods, Colossus provides a more solid basis for 
evaluating the injury.  The insurance company sets the value of the claims using its 
top claims professionals and its closed claim settlement data.  This information 
yields the best indicator for determining the value of a claim as insurers correctly 
value the claim approximately seventy percent of the time.115  The claims 
professional uses the Colossus system to enter injury data and determine how the 
injury claim has been valued in the past by the insurance company.  Using the 
medical records of each claimant provides a more individual evaluation of the 
injured party’s claim.116  The claims professional then has the confidence to make the 
decision to settle the claim or move forward to trial to have a jury determine the 
value of the claim.117  If the Colossus evaluation demonstrates that the insurance 
                                                                
109See STEIN, supra note 4, at § 22:8. 
110See Beagle, 417 P. 2d at 681. 
111See id. at 679. 
112MAGARICK & BROWNLEE, supra note 1, at § 17:9; Darroch, supra note 1 (stating that 
plaintiffs often share large jury verdicts but defendants generally do not publicize their 
victories to keep themselves out of “the crosshairs of a new lawyer”).  
113Robert I. Rubin, Remove Guesswork from Calculating Damages in Personal Injury 
Cases, DEF. COUNS. J., Jan. 1991, at 16. 
114See id. at 17. 
115See Benyo, 1998 Extra LEXIS 82, at *12; see also Darroch, supra note 1 (stating that 
insurers properly evaluate injury claims ninety percent of the time from his firm’s statistical 
data). 
116See Jones, supra note 31, at 8.33. 
117Attrino, supra note 25. 
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company has paid the policy limits on this type of claim in the past, the claims 
professional would know that a trial could threaten the insured’s assets.  Using 
Colossus as one tool in the evaluation process, therefore, assists the insurer in 
assessing the risk of a verdict in excess of the insured’s policy limits.  Because a 
prudent person would generally assess the risk to his assets prior to accepting a 
course of action that may threaten those assets, the insurer meets the negligence 
standard test when using Colossus to evaluate a third party’s injury claim. 
b.  Bad Faith Standard 
A majority of jurisdictions that allow a cause of action for bad faith require a 
higher standard than negligence on the part of the insurer to allow the plaintiff a legal 
remedy.118  Jurisdictions requiring the bad faith standard reason that it protects 
insureds and claimants from unequal bargaining power,119 while protecting insurance 
companies from “extortionate lawsuits.”120  In applying the bad faith standard, many 
courts allow plaintiffs to present evidence of negligent acts by the insurer, but the 
jury may not find for the plaintiff based on negligence alone.121  While bad faith is 
the favored standard, the courts are split on what conduct by the insurer constitutes a 
breach of its good faith duty.122  The more liberal courts apply a “no reasonable 
justification” test while the conservative courts add an “intent to injure” test.  
i.  No Reasonable Justification 
Liberal jurisdictions require the plaintiff to show the insurer did not have a 
reasonable justification for denying payment.123  If the insurer fails to “deal fairly 
and in good faith with its insured . . . without proper cause [the insured may sue the 
insurer] in tort for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”124  
Courts using this standard reason that insurers should not “[unreasonably withhold] 
payments due under the policy.”125  In denying a claim, the insurer may not act in an 
arbitrary manner.126  When deciding whether the insurer acted reasonably, the court 
may only use the information that the insurer knew at the time of the denial.127  In 
other words, the insurer can only offer the evidence that it used to deny the claim.  
                                                                
118ASHLEY, supra note 62, at § 2:15.  
119See Rawlings, 726 P.2d at 573.   
120Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 377 (Wis. 1978). 
121Ambassador Ins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 690 P.2d 1022, 1025 (N.M. 
1984). 
122ASHLEY, supra note 62, at § 2:15. 
123Zoppo, 644 N.E.2d at 400; see also Oulds v. Principal Mutual Life Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 
1431, 1436 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying Oklahoma law). 
124Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1037 (Cal. 1973).  
125Id. at 1037. 
126Morland v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 266, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 511, at *6 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 2000). 
127Indus. Indem. Co. v. Kallevig, 792 P.2d 520, 526 (Wash. 1990). 
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The insured has the burden of showing that the insurer did not have a good faith 
reason for denying the claim at the time the claim was denied.128   
In Zoppo v. Homestead Ins. Co.,129 the Ohio Supreme Court held that an insured 
does not have to prove the insurer intentionally committed bad faith against its 
insured.130  Homestead Insurance denied a property claim filed by Zoppo based on 
Homestead’s determination that Zoppo had intentionally set fire to his bar.131  
Homestead based its conclusions upon Zoppo’s inconsistent statements about his 
whereabouts on the night of the fire, a witness statement claiming Zoppo set the fire, 
and the bar’s financial losses.132  However, Zoppo provided evidence that the witness 
was paid for his statement against Zoppo.133  Zoppo also showed he had made 
improvements to the bar and that the market value of the building exceeded the 
policy limit by more than $45,000.134  Furthermore, Homestead failed to follow up 
with other suspects that “bragged in public that they were responsible for the fire.”135  
Due to Homestead’s inadequate investigation, the court determined that a jury could 
have found that Homestead denied the claim in an arbitrary manner.136  Homestead 
breached its duty to provide the insured with a good faith investigation and unjustly 
denied Zoppo’s claim.137
Compare Zoppo with Morland v. Allstate Ins Co.138  Morland alleged that Allstate 
acted in bad faith when it refused to pay Morland benefits under his underinsured 
motorist coverage.139  In holding that rational minds could not disagree that Allstate 
had a reasonable justification for its denial, the court affirmed Allstate’s motion for 
summary judgment, dismissing Morland’s bad faith action.140  Morland settled with 
the tortfeasor’s insurance carrier for $45,000 even though the limits were $50,000 
and requested payment of his policy limits under his underinsured motorists 
coverage with Allstate.141  The insured claimed the auto accident caused Carpal 
Tunnel Syndrome (“CTS”) as well as injuries to his neck and back.  However, the 
                                                                
128Kosierowski, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 588. 
129644 N.E.2d 397 (Ohio 1994). 
130Id. at 400. 
131Id. at 397. 






1382000 Ohio App. LEXIS 511 (Ohio Ct. App., 2000). 
139Id. at *3 
140Id. at *9-11. 
141Id. at *2.  In Ohio, an insured does not have to obtain the full limits of the tortfeasor’s 
policy to make a claim for underinsured benefits from his carrier. Fulmer v. Insura Prop. & 
Cas. Co., 760 N.E.2d 392, 400 (Ohio 2002). 
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insured also made a claim to the Ohio Bureau of Worker’s Compensation (BWC) 
“alleging that his CTS was a result of the repetitive hand motions that he performed 
in his work as a machinist.”142  Morland did not complain of pain in his hands or 
wrists at “the emergency room or during his [first] four visits to his family doctor 
after the accident.”143  Morland also told a neurologist that his CTS symptoms began 
prior to the accident.144  Therefore, Allstate determined that Morland received 
adequate compensation from the tortfeasor’s carrier and refused to pay anything 
more under the underinsured motorists coverage.145  Morland sued Allstate for 
payment of damages and the jury awarded the policy limits.146  While the jury found 
the accident caused the CTS, the court concluded that Allstate had the right to litigate 
the causation issue.147  The court reasoned that insurers have the right to litigate 
“fairly debatable” issues.148   
As both Zoppo and Morland illustrate, the insurer must thoroughly investigate 
the damages to demonstrate good faith claims handling.  Zoppo illustrates how an 
inadequate investigation leads to bad faith damages against an insurer.  Morland 
illustrates that an insurer that wrongfully denies a claim but investigates the damages 
properly avoids a bad faith action against it.  Colossus, by encouraging the claims 
professional to obtain all the relevant medical records, requires the insurer to 
diligently investigate the claimed injuries prior to determining the proper value of the 
claim.149
Proper use of Colossus requires the claims professional to examine all medical 
records in order to determine the proper diagnosis, prognosis, treatment and period 
of care for each injury and the economic damages suffered.150  An insurer “must 
diligently search for evidence which supports its insured’s claim.”151  The medical 
records are the most important documents the claims professional can acquire to 
support the insured’s injury claim.152  By examining the medical records prior to 
determining the value of an injury, the insurer acts reasonably in its investigation of 
the claim.153  A proper diagnosis will assist the claims professional in determining 
                                                                
142Morland, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 511, at *2. 
143Id. at *6. 
144Id. at *6. 
145Id. at *3. 
146Id. at *3-4. 
147Id. at *3,8-9. 
148Id. at *9. 
149Frey, Putting a Price on Auto Injuries, supra note 20. 
150See Colossus – Knowledge is the Key, supra note 40, at 1-2. 
151Great Divide, 79 P.3d at 608.  Because most jurisdictions use the reasonable 
justification standard for an insured making a claim against the insurer, only insured claims 
will be discussed in this section.  See ASHLEY, supra note 62 at § 2:15. 
152See MAGARICK & BROWNLEE, supra note 1, at § 6:12. 
153Oulds, 6 F.3d at 1438.  
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the value of the claim.154  If the injured party claims she had whiplash, the medical 
records will support her claim.  Additionally, the medical records will also tell the 
claims professional if the insured injured both her neck and back or just one area.  
Colossus takes these specific details into account when determining the severity of 
the injury.155  The claims professional, using Colossus as a guide, can determine the 
appropriate value of the injury based on the diagnosed injury.   
Colossus also requires the claims professional to enter the injury’s prognosis.  A 
detailed investigation of the medical records includes determining the injured party’s 
likely recovery and any permanency the injured party may suffer.156  The medical 
records will support the insured’s claim of continuing pain and the need for future 
treatment.157  If the injured party has a permanent impairment, the physician will 
document this in the records.  Using Colossus to assist in evaluating the claim, the 
claims professional will be able to determine if the injured party should be 
compensated for future pain and suffering.   
Using Colossus to investigate the injury also requires the claims professional to 
determine the type of treatment the injured party received.158  The type of treatment 
the injured party received helps determine the value of the injury.159  By using the 
medical records to enter information into Colossus, the claims professional 
determines the treatment provided to the injured party.  The claims professional then 
takes the type of treatment into consideration when determining a value of the claim.  
For example, if an injured person has his arm placed in a cast for six weeks, his 
inconvenience may not be as significant as a person who had surgery, a cast, and 
physical therapy.  With Colossus, the claims professional must determine all 
treatments to enter the information correctly.160
The period of care entered into Colossus also assists the insurer in determining 
the proper value of the claim.  The length of care provided to an injured party 
influences the value of a claim.161  The medical records document the amount of time 
                                                                
154See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Weiford, 831 P.2d at 1265 (demonstrating that 
State Farm increased its offer after the diagnosis was changed from a minor soft tissue injury 
to a more serious nerve injury). 
155Colossus – Knowledge is the Key, supra note 40, at 2.  
156See MAGARICK & BROWNLEE, supra note 1, at § 6:12. 
157Colossus uses the following prognoses: “resolution undetermined; no complaint, 
resolved; complaint, no more treatment; complaint further treatment; and complaint, guarded 
prognosis.” Colossus – Knowledge is the Key, supra note 40, at 2. 
158See Jones, supra note 31, at 8.32; Bremer & Trollop, supra note 18, at 15. 
159See Westberry, 590 So. 2d at 161 (discussing the care required for the sustained 
injuries). 
160Colossus does not have all conceivable treatments in the system.  However, by 
thoroughly reviewing the records, the claims professional will know all the treatments 
provided to the claimant even if its not entered into the system.  See Jones, supra note 31, at 
8.33. 
161See Beagle, 417 P.2d at 675 n.3 (demonstrating that the court considered the length of 
the injured party’s hospitalization and time wearing a brace when determining the general 
damages awarded by the jury were too low). 
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it takes for the injuries to properly heal.  This information obviously assists the 
claims professional in determining the proper value of the claim.  Typically, a 
cervical strain that heals in six weeks has less value than a cervical strain that heals 
in twelve weeks.  Colossus requests specific dates and/or length of care provided to 
the injured party.  However, if a party takes longer than expected to heal from an 
injury, the issue of malingering may also factor into the evaluation.162  “‘More than 
one-third of all auto bodily injury liability claims appeared to involve fraud’ and/or 
inflated claims.”163  Colossus assists the claims professional in identifying extensive 
treatment periods by “flagging” the user.164  This warning can be used by the claims 
professional to investigate if there were other circumstances that prolonged the 
recovery time.165  For example, the injured party may have osteoporosis complicating 
his recovery.  By reviewing the medical records and entering the information into 
Colossus, the claims professional identifies the period of care the injury required and 
potential complications of the healing process. 
Colossus can also assist the insurer in determining the amount of economic 
damages.  A good faith investigation requires an insurer to determine the amount of 
medical bills and lost wages.166  Colossus allows the claims professional to enter this 
information into the consultation.167  By comparing the medical records to the 
medical bills, the claims professional can determine what medical expenses relate to 
the injury.  Also, the claims professional will know if other bills have not been 
submitted allowing him to request this information.  Furthermore, the medical 
records will support the injured party’s disability period.168  The court in Benyo v. 
Allstate Ins. Co. held that Allstate demonstrated a reasonable investigation when it 
attempted to support Benyo’s lost wage claim.169  The claims professional also used 
Colossus to assist in evaluating the injury value.170  Allstate allowed the full 
disability period but had trouble supporting Benyo’s full wage claim.171  The claims 
                                                                
162Voland, 943 P.2d at 813 n.3.  
163Guidera, supra note 7 (quoting a 1999 report by the Insurance Research Council).  
164Jones, supra note 31, at 8.32-33; Bremer & Trollop, supra note 18, at 13. 
165Colossus brings potential malingering issues to the attention of the claims professional 
for him to investigate and make a determination whether this impacts the settlement value of 
the claim. See Jones, supra note 31, at 8.32 – 8.33. 
166See Benyo, 1998 Extra LEXIS 82, at * 9-10. 
167See Colossus – Knowledge is the Key, supra note 40, at 2.  
168Id.   
169Benyo, 1998 Extra LEXIS 82, at *7. 
170Id. at *6. 
171The claims professional reviewed the information provided by Benyo and determined 
the lost wage information pre-dated the auto accident.  Id. at *2-3.  Consequently, Allstate 
requested the self-employed Benyo to supply prior tax returns and names of customers so 
Allstate could confirm Benyo’s lost wage claim. Id. at *3.  Benyo refused, leaving Allstate no 
choice but to offer only $8,400 of the $36,200 in lost wages claimed. Id. at *2,5.  After 
offsetting the tortfeasor’s payment of $15,000 and the medical expenses of $4270, it appears 
that the arbitration panel split the difference between Allstate and Benyo on the lost wage 
portion with a total award of $15,000 from Allstate.  Id. at *5-7. 
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professional likely determined the period of disability through her review of the 
records when entering the Colossus information.  The court determined that the 
claims professional used Colossus as a tool and did not rely on it exclusively, which 
demonstrated good faith claims handling.172  Therefore, using Colossus as a guide for 
economic damages can assist the claims professional in determining the proper value 
of the injury claim. 
By reviewing the medical records, the claims professional identifies the proper 
diagnosis, prognosis, treatment, and period of care for each injury and the amount of 
economic damages.  The claims representative then enters all of this information into 
Colossus.  Colossus, by using the insurer’s data, provides a recommended value for 
the injury.  Then, the claims representative determines the final settlement value to 
conclude if the insured is owed any benefits.  If the tortfeasor’s carrier has already 
satisfied the insured’s claim, the claims professional may reasonably deny the claim.  
Colossus assists the insurer in adequately investigating the insured’s underinsured 
motorists claim. 
ii.  Intent to Injure 
The more conservative jurisdictions add an intentional element to the bad faith 
standard.  An insurer acts in bad faith if its conduct was unreasonable and the insurer 
has “knowledge of or reckless disregard for the fact that the conduct is 
unreasonable.”173  An insurer cannot intentionally injure the rights of the insured.174  
The insurer’s intended acts or omissions causing the insured’s harm also meet the 
intentional element.175  Using the intentional element allows insurers to aggressively 
investigate legitimate coverage and payment disputes.176   
Kosierowski v. Allstate Ins. Co.,177 demonstrates the high burden the insured must 
show to obtain a remedy in an intent to injure jurisdiction.  The Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals held that the insurer’s delay in claim settlement may have amounted to 
negligence, but clearly was not bad faith.178  Plaintiff Kosierowski requested policy 
limits of $100,000 under her underinsured motorist coverage with defendant Allstate 
Insurance on October 11, 1995.179  Allstate finally agreed to pay this amount on 
December 8, 1996.180  The court determined that both Kosierowski and Allstate were 
                                                                
172Id. at *11-12. 
173Galusha v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 844 F. Supp. 1401, 1404 (1994) (citing Travelers Ins. 
Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258, 1275 (Colo. 1958)).  
174Rawlings, 726 P.2d at 570; Benyo, 1998 Extra LEXIS 82, at *8. 
175Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 376. 
176Jung, 949 F. Supp. at 360. Proactive claims handling by the insurer combats fraud and 
ultimately helps the average citizen pay lower premiums.  See Bowers, supra note 6 (quoting 
Barry Zalma, an attorney specializing in suspected fraudulent insurance claims, “If an insurer 
doesn’t fight fraud, the word goes out on the street that they are an easy touch, and the claims 
count goes up.”) 
17751 F. Supp. 2d 583 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (applying Pennsylvania law). 
178Id. at 593. 
179Id. at 586. 
180Id. at 587. 
19Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2005
126 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:107 
to blame for the year delay in settlement.181  Kosierowski did not give Allstate 
sufficient documentation of the $118,633 wage loss claim for five and a half 
months.182  Allstate, still questioning the legitimacy of Kosierowski’s wage loss 
claim for a minor soft tissue injury,183 waited until Kosierowski’s statement under 
oath to evaluate the claim.184  Even though Allstate admitted the statement was not 
used in determining the settlement value,185 the court rejected Kosierowski’s 
contention that Allstate’s actions constituted bad faith.186  Allstate did not act 
unreasonably in waiting for clarification of the wage loss187 as Allstate has the right 
to investigate legitimate coverage issues.188  Although Allstate may have been 
negligent in delaying settlement until after the statement, it did not act in bad faith 
because Allstate did not intend to injure its insured.  
As illustrated by Kosierowski, the intent to injure standard requires more culpable 
conduct by the insurer than the no reasonable justification standard illustrated by 
Zoppo.  The insurer in this jurisdiction obviously will meet its duties of good faith by 
using Colossus as demonstrated under the last two sections.  An insurer using 
Colossus to investigate and evaluate the injury claim does not act with reckless 
disregard or intent to injure.  On the contrary, the insurer uses the system to 
determine the appropriate value for the injury to settle the claim.  Therefore, an 
insurer using Colossus to evaluate and investigate the injury claim acts in good faith 
in a negligent or bad faith jurisdiction. 
2.  Breach of Contract 
In jurisdictions that do not allow a plaintiff to recover under the tort of bad faith 
or statutory provisions, the court may allow a remedy for policyholders under a 
breach of contract claim.189  Insurance contracts impose an implied duty upon the 
insurer to treat its insured fairly.190  A breach of this good faith duty, therefore, is a 
                                                                
181Id. at 593. 
182Id. at 591. 
183Id. at 590 n.6.  
184Id. at 587. The court did not blame Allstate for the delay in obtaining Kosierowski’s 
statement under oath.  It determined the delay was “an ordinary part of legal and insurance 
work.” Id. at 590. 
185Id. at 591. 
186Id. at 592-93. 
187Id. at 591.  
188Hyde Athletic Indus., Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 969 F. Supp. 289, 307 (E.D. Pa. 1997) 
(applying Pennsylvania law). 
189Mesmer v. Maryland Auto Ins. Fund, 725 A.2d 1053, 1061 (Md. 1999) (allowing a 
breach of contract action when an insurer incorrectly denies coverage to its insured while the 
insurer’s duty to protect its insured in settlement of third party claims gives rise to a tort cause 
of action); see also ASHLEY, supra note 62, at § 2:14 (arguing that the breach of contract cause 
of action should be adopted by all states for pure first-party claims but not for claims arising 
from the insurer’s failure to settle a third-party claim within the insured’s policy limits).   
190Beck, 701 P.2d at 798. 
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breach of the contract.191  However, most courts choose not to use the breach of 
contract claim as it provides inadequate compensation.192  Traditionally, the remedy 
for breach of contract is only performance of the contract.193  However, the remedy 
under the tort of bad faith allows both emotional and punitive damages.194  Courts 
generally prefer to use the tort cause of action to provide more incentives for the 
insurance company to perform the contract.195  However, some jurisdictions simply 
apply a liberal remedy to the breach of contract claim in the insurance setting that 
allows compensation for an insured’s damages that naturally result from the insurer’s 
breach of its good faith duty.196
In Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., the Supreme Court of Utah determined that an 
insurer that breaches its duty to investigate and evaluate a claim promptly and 
reasonably has breached its good faith duty implied by contract.197  The court, using 
the remedy propositioned in Hadley v. Baxendale,198 stated that an insurer could be 
liable for foreseeable damages that naturally flow from the insurer’s violation of the 
implied covenant of good faith.199  Plaintiff Beck submitted a demand for policy 
limits of $20,000 to the defendant Farmers Insurance.200  Within ten days, Farmers 
rejected the settlement offer without an explanation for its refusal.201  Concluding 
that Farmers’ failure to explain its rejection within such a short time frame raised a 
question of fact that Farmers failed to fully investigate and evaluate the claim, the 
Utah Supreme Court overruled Farmers’ summary judgment motion.202  The court 
stated that insureds purchase insurance policies to provide an insured with protection 
during a loss and specifically “peace of mind.”203  For this reason, an insurance 
company can foresee that the breach of its good faith duty could cause mental 
anguish entitling the insured to compensation for such damages.204  Therefore, an 
insurer may owe an insured more than the amount of the policy if the insurer 
breaches its good faith duty imposed by the law in Utah.205
                                                                
191Id. 
192Acquista, 285 A.D.2d at 79. 
193Id. at 78. 
194See id. at 78-80. 
195Id. at 78-79. 
196Drop Anchor Realty Trust v. Hartford Ins. Co., 496 A.2d 339, 342 (N.H. 1985); 
Acquista, 285 A.D.2d at 80-81; Beck, 701 P.2d at 801-02. 
197701 P.2d at 798. 
198156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854). 
199Beck, 701 P.2d at 801. 
200Id. at 796. 
201Id. 
202Id. at 802-03. 
203Id. at 802. 
204Id. at 801. 
205Id. at 801-02. 
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Colossus assists the insurer in maintaining its good faith duty to treat the insured 
fairly.  An insurer fails to treat the insured in good faith if the claim is not evaluated 
fairly.206  A fair evaluation includes an objective evaluation by the insurer.207  The 
insurer, by using the medical records as discussed in the bad faith standard section, 
uses objectivity in evaluating the claim.  Colossus, through the claims professional’s 
diligent review of the medical records, forces the claims professional to evaluate a 
claim objectively.208  It prevents a claims professional from drawing on personal 
experiences (rather than professional) by analyzing the injured party’s claim through 
the medical records.  For example, a claims professional that has had prior knee 
surgery may be more sympathetic to an injured party with a knee injury.  This claims 
professional may evaluate the injury higher than his co-worker who has not had any 
prior knee complaints.   
Furthermore, in Christiansen v. First Ins. Co., the insured alleged that the insurer 
did not objectively evaluate the insured’s damages.209  The insured stated that the 
claims professional “did not seem very interested in the damage that caused the 
leaking roof.  Instead, he came with the mindset that he would find that the roof was 
not substantially damaged.”210  The insurer must investigate the claim objectively 
without “construct[ing] a pretextual basis for denial.”211  Colossus requires the claims 
professional to use the medical records and set aside any subjective emotions the 
claims professional may have towards the injured party.212  Colossus uses the entries 
made from the claims professional’s review of the medical records to assist the 
claims professional in evaluating the claim.  Therefore, Colossus promotes an 
objective and fair evaluation of the injury.   
However, critics allege that insurance professionals who lack proper training will 
incorrectly value the claim and insurers manipulate the data to lower claim 
payments.213  The objectivity in reviewing the medical documentation prevents 
human manipulation.  Furthermore, CSC trains each insurer on the proper use of 
Colossus.214  After this initial training, it is up to the insurers to handle the ongoing 
training of their employees.  Since a claims professional has a supervisor and/or 
manager to critique his work, the insurer likely reviews the claims professional’s use 
of Colossus.  Furthermore, discovery in bad faith cases involve sharing the claims 
                                                                
206Id. at 801. 
207See id. at 800 (stating that an insurer must pay claims under the contract regardless of 
the insurer’s subjective state of mind). 
208Attrino, supra note 25. 
209967 P.2d at 646. 
210Id.  
211State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Simmons, 963 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tex. 1998) (using the tort 
of bad faith standard to enforce insurers to play fairly with its insureds). 
212Kevin M. Quinley, Boot Me Up, C3PO, CLAIMS MAG., July 2002, at 39. 
213Charles J. Mazurasky, Insurer Bad Faith Claims Arising from “Colossus” 
Computerized Claims Handling, TRIAL EXCELLENCE, Oct. 2001, at 1; Jones, supra note 31, at 
8.33. 
214Mogel, supra note 47. 
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file with the plaintiff.215  Therefore, an insurer knows only an accurate evaluation 
will avoid a bad faith judgment against the insurer.  The possibility of punitive 
damages certainly also deters an insurer from manipulating the data.216  A study by 
Jury Verdict Research and General Cologne Re determined that the mean punitive 
damage awards ranged between $6,800,000 and $10,600,000 for bad faith cases.217  
Additionally, the compensatory awards for bad faith ranged from $634,000 to more 
than $1,000,000.218  The threat of a $1,000,000 lawsuit obviously deters an insurer 
from manipulating the data.  Only by using the medical records to objectively review 
the claim will the insurer avoid bad faith actions by its insureds.   
3.  Statutory Causes of Action 
In 1945, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) drafted 
the Model Act Relating to Unfair Methods of Competition and Unfair and Deceptive 
Acts in Practices in the Business of Insurance (Model Act) for the states to use in 
regulating insurance practices.219  In 1971, while four bills were pending in Congress 
giving the Federal Trade Commission power to regulate the insurance industry, the 
NAIC amended the Model Act.220  The amendments included an enumerated list of 
unfair claims settlement practices.221  It also gave the insurance commissioner 
enforcement powers for an insurer’s violation of the listed unfair claims settlement 
practices.222  Currently, forty-eight states have enacted legislation or adopted 
administrative codes based on the Model Act.223
                                                                
215Gary Blake & Bob Siems, Careless Writing and Bad Faith Law Suits, CLAIMS MAG., 
Feb. 2004, at 23. 
216See Tony Doris, Lowball Settlement Offers Raise the Stakes for Insurers, MIAMI DAILY 
BUS. REV., May 16, 2002 (stating “Punitives are the ‘real teeth’ behind bad-faith actions.”) 
217Blake & Siems, supra note 215, at 23.  However, the awards can go significantly 
higher.  A Utah jury awarded $145,000,000 in punitive damages. State Farm Mut. Auto.  Ins. 
Co. v. Campbell, 123 S. Ct. 1513, 1519 (2003).    
Like the standard for bad faith, the jurisdictions differ on what type of conduct by the 
insurer constitutes an award of punitive damages.  In New Mexico, the court may allow a 
punitive award if the jury awards compensatory damages for the tort. Jessen v. National 
Excess Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 1244, 1246 (N.M. 1989).  However, most jurisdictions require a 
more significant culpable conduct. Rawlings, 726 P.2d at 578 (requiring “aggravated, 
outrageous, malicious or fraudulent” conduct); Farmland Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 36 S.W.3d 
368, 382 (Ky. 2000) (requiring oppressive, fraudulent or malicious conduct); Preston v. 
Murty, 512 N.E.2d 1174, 1175 (Ohio 1987) (allowing punitive damages for conduct that is 
“characterized by hatred, ill will, or a spirit of revenge” or for reckless conduct that 
consciously disregards safety of others).   
218Blake & Siems, supra note 215, at 23. 
219ASHLEY, supra note 62, at § 9:01. 
220Id. 
221Model Act § 4(9). 
222Model Act § 8. 
223ASHLEY, supra note 62, at § 9:01 & n.22. 
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A controversial issue surrounding the adoption of the Model Act by the states is 
whether it provides a private cause of action when an insurer violates one of the 
provisions.224  In State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Reeder,225 the Kentucky 
Supreme Court held that a non-insured party may sue the insurance company directly 
for violation of the unfair claims settlement practices statute.226  In Reeder, State 
Farm insured Hampton, who hit the Reeders’ carport with his car, causing the carport 
to collapse.227  State Farm estimated the damages at $8,471, but the Reeders’ lowest 
estimate was $13,392.228  A jury returned a verdict of $11,000, but the trial court 
dismissed the Reeders’ claim for violation of the unfair claims settlement practice 
statute.229  The Kentucky Supreme Court held that the Reeders could pursue State 
Farm directly for violation of the unfair claims settlement practice statute.230  The 
court reasoned that the legislature enacted the statute to allow a third-party remedy 
where the common law did not.231  Also, the statute did not specifically prohibit a 
third party from making a claim against the insurer for breach of the unfair claims 
settlement statute.232  Therefore, the court concluded “there is no reason why [the 
unfair claims settlement practices statute] should not be applied to third party 
claims.”233  
However, the majority of jurisdictions do not allow a third-party direct action.234  
Instead, these jurisdictions reason that the insurance commissioner has the sole 
enforcement power of an insurer that violates the unfair claims settlement 
practices.235  The NAIC did not intend to create a private cause of action and in its 
1991 amendment of the Model Act, the authors specifically state, “Nothing herein 
shall be construed to create or imply a private cause of action for violation of this 
Act.”236  Currently, only seven states have adopted the amended act, but more states 
will likely follow.237  However, it is important to note that an insurer that adopts the 
1991 amended Model Act may still allow a private cause of action by a first or third 
party through other statutory provisions.  For example, the Washington Supreme 
Court stated that an insured might bring an action against its insurer for violation of 
                                                                
224See id. at § 9:01. 
225763 S.W.2d 116 (Ky. 1988). 
226Id. at 118. 
227Id. at 117. 
228Id. 
229Id. 




234ASHLEY, supra note 62 at § 9:03. 
235See Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 758 P.2d 58, 68 (Cal. 1988). 
236Unfair Trade Practices Act § 1. 
237ASHLEY, supra note 62, at § 9:14. 
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the insurer’s duty to act in good faith under the Consumer Protection Act.238  Also, an 
insured may use the unfair claims settlement practices act as evidence of the industry 
standard of conduct.239  Therefore, an insurance company’s violation of the unfair 
claims settlement practices act may indirectly create private causes of action for the 
insured or a third-party claimant. 
The use of Colossus helps insurers comply with Section 4(9) of the amended 
1979 Model Act in settling both insured’s and claimant’s injury claims.240  
Specifically, the provisions that Colossus can help insurers avoid are:  “(c) failing to 
adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investigation of claims 
arising under insurance policies; (d) refusing to pay claims without conducting a 
reasonable investigation based upon all available information; . . . [and] (f) not 
attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims 
in which liability has become reasonably clear.”241  While the reasonable 
investigation, complete evaluations, and equitable settlements have been discussed in 
the previous sections, the insurer’s duty to adopt reasonable standards or consistency 
in the handling of its claims has yet to be addressed.    
By using Colossus to promote consistent settlements, the insurer establishes a 
reasonable standard for handling its first party and third party injury claims.242  The 
state insurance departments want insurers to pay claims consistently.243  By using the 
insurer data entered into Colossus, the insurer bases its settlement values on past 
claims history.  Payment based on a collection of prior claims data provides a more 
solid estimation of the settlement value than one person’s assessment of the injuries 
even if the person is an experienced claims professional.  As attorney Robert 
Darroch stated, “Ask [ten different attorneys, judges arbitrators, insurers] and you 
are likely to get [ten] different opinions.”244  However, insurers must use Colossus as 
a tool and avoid becoming dependent on the system.  As the cases have illustrated, 
courts want an independent evaluation of the claim.245  Using Colossus to evaluate 
injuries promotes a reasonable standard of consistent claims settlements in avoiding 
a violation of the unfair claims settlement practices. 
                                                                
238Tank, 715 P.2d at 1140. 
239Kosierowski, 51 F. Supp. 2d at 595 n.14. 
240Under the 1991 Amendment, the unfair claims settlement practices are listed under 
Section 4, A through N.  
241Model Act § 4(9).  Under the 1991 amendments, (c) becomes C, (d) becomes F, the 
drafters left off “based upon all available information,” and (f) becomes D. Unfair Trade 
Practices Act § 4. 
242See William T. Barker & Ben Love, Bad Faith Risk Reduction: Company Procedures, 
23 No. 20 & 21 Ins. Litig. Rep. 645 (Dec. 20, 2001). 
243Whitney, supra note 1. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Because Colossus requires the insurer to have all the facts and to use the medical 
documentation to evaluate the injury, an insurer exercises good faith claims handling 
when using the system.  A review of the different standards of good faith claims 
handling by the courts in the United States provides the following: (1) in a 
negligence standard jurisdiction, the insurer must “exercise such care and diligence 
which an ordinary, prudent person would exercise in the management of his own 
business;”246 (2) in a bad faith jurisdiction, the insurer must have a reasonable 
justification in deciding not to pay a claim; (3) if a jurisdiction recognizes bad faith 
under a breach of contract case, the insurer has a contractual obligation to fairly 
evaluate claims under the contract; and (4) legislatures may enact statutes to provide 
a remedy for private parties if an insurer violates a provision of the unfair claims 
settlement practices.  With the use of Colossus, insurance companies can handle the 
insured or third party’s injury claim with good faith under any of these standards.  
The use of Colossus requires the claims professional to diligently investigate the 
facts of the injury, completely evaluate the injury, objectively review the medical 
information, and pay injury claims consistently.  This complete and objective review 
of the injury claim removes some of the guesswork of calculating the general 
damages to be paid on a claim.  While some may view Colossus as an anti-human 
approach to handling claims, it simply simulates the human thought process on how 
a claim should be evaluated.247  Furthermore, Colossus only acts as a foundation for 
evaluating a claim by allowing the claims professional to use other factors, such as 
witness credibility, venue selection and attorney capabilities, to determine the final 
settlement value of the claim.248  Using Colossus, or a similar expert tool, 
demonstrates good faith claims handling by the insurance company.   
Let’s return to the opening example.  The example identified only one injury, a 
fractured leg but did you actually sustain other injuries documented by the medical 
records?  Most people only focus on the main injury, but the medical diagnoses may 
have included numerous abrasions, contusions or sprains to other parts of the body.  
The example lists the surgery and physical therapy as treatment but nothing else.  
The medical records may disclose a hospitalization, injections, or potential for 
removal of the hardware in the leg.  The example states occasional aches and pains 
as grounds for the recovery but the medical reports may state you have an 
impairment rating due to the trauma caused to the largest bone in your body.  By 
using Colossus to assist in the evaluation of your injury, the claims professional will 
have an individualized assessment of your injury for your settlement meeting.  Both 
of you will have a better idea of the value of your claim, which takes some of the 
guesswork takes arbitrary values out of the evaluation process. 
DAWN R. BONNETT
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